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ABSTRACT. This paper analyses and compares World Bank structural
adjustment programmes and International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabi-
lisation programmes in Malawi during the 1980s and Jordan during the
1990s. Both are small aid-dependant economies with a narrow export
base making them vulnerable to exogenous shocks. The article pays
particular attention to the political economy environment in which re-
form programmes are implemented and to the role of exogenous
shocks, both adverse and favourable, in determining the outcome of the
programmes. The sequencing of reforms is also assessed in both coun-
tries. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery
Service:1-800-342-9678.E-mailaddress:<getinfo@haworthpressinc.com>Web-
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the sphere of influence of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) has left no devel-
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oping region untouched. Developing countries from the Middle East
to Africa to Latin America and former Communist regimes of Central
and Eastern Europe have all resorted to the IMF and WB financial
support. Even some of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs),
once seen as being immune from the external influence of internation-
al agencies, have recently found themselves in desperate need of IMF
and WB financial support.
But this support is not unconditional. Recipient countries must
carry out certain reform measures, known as stabilisation and structur-
al adjustment lending programmes (SALPs) designed by the IMF and
WB officials. The general aim of these programmes, according to the
IMF, is the ‘‘restoration and maintenance of viability to the balance of
payments in an environment of price stability and sustainable rates of
economic growth’’ (Cook and Kirkpatrick: 1990: 170). Between 1978
and 1996, developing countries in different regions implemented more
than 200 such programmes (Jaradat: 1994: 111).
This article analyses the experience of adjustment and stabilisation
in Malawi and Jordan. Malawi was one of the earliest adjusting coun-
tries undertaking an extensive reform programme in the 1980s. Partic-
ular attention is paid to the WB supply side programme under the three
SALs, which ran from 1980-86. Jordan, by contrast, was a late adjust-
er initiating its programme a decade after Malawi and placing more
emphasis on IMF-guided demand side stabilisation policies. Hence we
analyse stabilisation and adjustment in Jordan over the period
1990-96. Despite differences in their per capita income and the level
of development, both of these countries suffered from similar external
and internal imbalances that necessitated negotiations with the IMF
and WB, albeit at different times. Both are also small economies with
a narrow export base making them highly vulnerable to exogenous
shocks. But the outcome of policy measures was totally different. The
unfavourable outcome in Malawi was explained by a WB official ‘‘as
simply an unfortunate case of promising reforms, bad luck’’ (Gulhati,
1989). The more favourable outcome in Jordan was explained by an
IMF senior official as a case of a ‘‘government totally committed to
continue implementing faithfully the arrangement concluded with the
IMF, noting that in many respects Jordan has gone beyond IMF pre-
scriptions’’ (Al-Fanik, March 1997: 3).
We challenge these views in this article, paying particular attention
to the role of the political economy and the role of exogenous shocks
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in determining the outcome of reform. We argue that Jordan has not
gone beyond either the IMF or WB prescriptions, nor can commitment
and faithfulness explain its favourable outcome to IMF/WB policy
prescriptions. Jordan’s felicitous outcome, like Malawi’s unfortunate
upshot, was also largely a case of luck, in this case, good luck in the
form of favourable exogenous shocks. Malawi, on the other hand, was
afflicted by bad luck in the form of unfavourable exogenous shocks.
To some extent, outcomes in both countries were also influenced by
inappropriate policy prescriptions by the IMF and WB, which wrongly
regarded both economies as non-interventionist and free market, and
by policies undertaken by their governments which were quite inde-
pendent of IMF and WB policy reform conditions.
The next section looks at what the literature says about the effec-
tiveness of the IMF and WB programmes in developing countries.
Then, the main implications of reform in developing countries for
international business managers are discussed. This is followed by a
presentation of the economic cycles (boom to bust) of Jordan and
Malawi respectively that necessitated co-operation with the IMF and
WB. Next, the international institutions diagnosis and reform prescrip-
tions in each country are analyzed. Finally, the impact of the reforms
are presented and conclusions drawn.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Stabilisation and SALPs, as mentioned earlier, aim at the restoration
of external and internal balances in an environment of price stability
and sustainable rates of economic growth. In the 1970s and 1980s,
many developing countries experienced problems in each of these
economic areas, and therefore implemented, mostly in conjunction
with the IMF and WB, more than 200 such programmes to restore
their macroeconomic equilibrium. But what difference did these pro-
grammes make to the recipient countries’ economies?
The first real attempt to evaluate stabilisation programmes was
undertaken by two IMF staff, Reichman and Slillso, in 1978. They
compared the behavior of the balance of payments, inflation and
growth rates in the two-year period before the programmes started
with the two-year period after the programme ended. Their study,
which included seventy-nine IMF supported programmes implement-
ed during the period 1963-72, found that a significant improvement in
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the Balance of Payments (B of P) had taken place only in one fourth of
all programmes evaluated, the rest of the cases experienced no signifi-
cant change. The impact on growth rates and inflation were mixed,
both increasing in some cases and decreasing in others (quoted in
Khan, 1990, p 1990).
The ‘‘before versus after’’ approach was also used by Connors
(1979), Killick (1984), and Pastor (1987) to evaluate the effects of the
IMF programmes in a number of developing countries which imple-
mented stabilisation programmes during 1965-81. These studies came
more or less to the same conclusion: IMF programmes had no discern-
ible effect on growth rates, current account deficits, and inflation. The
only exception was Pastor’s study which found that IMF programmes
were associated with higher inflation rates. Corbo (1990) also used the
‘‘before and after’’ methodology to examine the effect of the WB
SAPs in a number of developing countries. Corbo observed an im-
provement in GDP growth and saving rates in the post-programme
period accompanied by a decline in the investment/GDP ratio.
However, the performance of an economy is influenced not only by
the IMF and WB programmes, but also by other important, exogenous
factors, like changes in weather conditions, world demand, terms of
trade, capital inflows and an end or start of a war. The ‘‘before versus
after’’ approach cannot isolate the effects of the IMF and WB pro-
grammes from the effects of these external factors, and, therefore, is
only ‘‘useful to show what happened in programme countries, but not
why it happened’’ (Mosely et al: 1991: 184).
To overcome the weaknesses of the first approach, some analysts
have used the ‘‘plan versus target’’ test. In this approach, targets set by
the donor at the inception of the programme are compared with the
actual performance or outcome under the programme period. The
difference between target and actual performance, either negative or
positive, is attributed to the programme itself.
This test was used by Reichman in 1978 and Zulu and Nsouli in
1985. Reichman’s study examined twenty-one programmes imple-
mented in eighteen countries during 1973-75. He found that the B of P
targets were met or exceeded in nearly two-thirds of the programmes.
The targets for inflation were exceeded in over half of the pro-
grammes, and that 62% of the programmes met their growth targets.
Zulu and Nsouli study, which examined a number of IMF programmes
implemented in Africa during 1980-88, observed that the current ac-
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count targets were met in 38% of the programmes, inflation targets in
about 48%, and growth targets in only 20%.
Despite its attractiveness, the ‘‘plan versus target’’ approach is no
better than the ‘‘before versus after’’ approach in predicting the influ-
ence of exogenous factors on the performance of an economy. Cor-
relation does not mean causation, and no association can be found
between performance and targets.
Mosely et al. (1991: 184) argue that the only approach which can
provide any hope to isolate the impact of the IMF and WB pro-
grammes from other exogenous factors is the ‘‘with versus without’’
test. Here, the behavior of major macroeconomic indicators in pro-
gramme countries during the programme period is compared with the
behavior of the same macroeconomic indicators in non-programme
countries, i.e., a control group, over the same period. The difference in
economic performance between programme and non-programme
countries is attributed to the programme itself. Donovan was the first
to use this approach in 1981 and 1982 to evaluate the effects of a
number of IMF programmes in developing countries. Comparisons
were made in both studies over one and three-year horizons. Donovan
found that the performance of exports and inflation in programme
countries was better in the first study irrespective of time comparisons.
Growth performance was ambiguous, being higher in programme
countries during the one-year comparison but worse during the three-
year comparison. In the 1982 study, Donovan found that inflation rate,
current and B of P deficits were all lower in programme countries.
However, growth performance was worse in programme countries,
which also experienced a decline in investment/GDP ratio, irrespec-
tive of time comparison.
However, Donovan’s studies simply compared the macroeconomic
performance of countries which implemented IMF-supported pro-
grammes with that of the control group but without taking into consid-
eration the differences between and among these countries: pro-
gramme countries generally have larger imbalances in their economies
which lead them to introduce these programmes in the first place.
Therefore, they are unrepresentative of developing countries as a
whole. Moreover, not all programme countries have the same degree
of compliance with the IMF and WB conditionalities. Some simply
comply more than others. Failing to isolate the influences of these two
points is likely to give misleading results.
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To avoid these problems, Mosely et al. used a more sophisticated
‘‘with versus without’’ test in 1991 to examine the impact of the WB
programmes in twenty-five developing countries during 1980-87.
They carefully chose a control country to pair with each adjusting
country ensuring that the paired countries were as similar as possible
in terms of economic structure and exposure to exogeneous shocks,
differing only in that one undertook an adjustment programme and the
other did not. Adjusting countries were also broken down into two
sub-groups- high and low compliance countries. Their results were
remarkably similar to the results of a study by the WB published in
1988, which used almost the same approach. Both sets of results sug-
gested that programme countries had better current account perfor-
mance, worse investment performance and little difference in growth
rates in relation to non-programme countries. However, the authors
admitted that even in this approach they could not isolate the effect of
the IMF and WB programmes from the effect of other injections of
finance, including aid, workers remittances and other lendings (Mose-
ly et al.: 1991: 186 and 204).
The final approach used to evaluate the effectiveness of the IMF
and WB programmes is ‘‘comparison of simulations’’ approach,
which requires an econometric model and extremely accurate data that
are difficult to find in most developing countries. Khan (1990) favours
this approach, and used it twice in 1981 and 1985. The first study
found that IMF programmes were associated with lower growth rates
and higher inflation rate. The second study found that although the B
of P improved, this was at the expense of higher inflation rate and
lower growth rates.
In summary, the available empirical evidence suggests that the IMF
and WB programmes have had a positive impact on the B of P of
adjusting countries, negative effect on investment, varied effects on
the current account and no discernible effect on inflation and growth
rates (Table 1). However, all of the above studies are highly aggre-
gated analysing groups of countries and failing to isolate individual
country experiences. Any effective and successful assessment of these
programmes requires a comprehensive country by country analysis of
both the internal and external economic and political environments.
This paper aspires to achieve this objective.
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TABLE 1. Assessment of IMF and WB Programmes in Developing Countries,
1963-1988
Study Date Time No of No of Method Effect
of period Progs. countrs BOP CA I IV G
study
Reichman & Slillso 1979 1963- 79 -- Before-after 0 0 0
72
Connors 1979 1973- 31 23 Before-after 0 0 0
77
Killick 1984 1974- 38 24 Before-after 0 0 0
79
Pastor 1987 1965- 18 Before-after + 0 - 0
81
Corbo 1990 Before-after -- +
Reichman 1978 1973- 20 18 Plan-target + +
75
Zulu & Nsouli 1985 1980- 35 22 Plan-target -- 0 --
81
Donovan 1981 1970- 12 12 With- -- 0
76 without
Donovan 1982 1971- 78 With- + + + -- --
80 without
WB 1988 With-
without + -- 0
Mosely et al. 1991 1981- 25 With-
86 without + -- 0
Khan & Knight 1981 Simulation + --
Khan & Knight 1985 Simulation + -- --
+ Positive change. -- Negative change. 0 No effect. BOPmeans balance of payments. CAmeans current account.
I means inflation. IV means investment. G means growth.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
Stabilisation and SALPs have a profound effect on the economic
and political environment within which the private sector, both domes-
tic and international, does business in developing countries. Markets,
prices and in many cases foreign trade have been liberalised, the role
of the state in the economy reduced, privatisation and deregulation
introduced, monetary policy tightened, and the financial sector re-
formed. Measures to facilitate and attract more foreign investment
have also been part of these reforms, including the introduction of new
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investment laws, regulations to protect property rights and relaxation
of restrictions pertaining to foreign ownership. Many sectors which
were five or ten years ago preserved for domestic investors are only
now open for foreign competition.
These changes and policies, to the extent they were implemented,
have important implications for international business managers and
the way they choose to serve the markets of developing economies.
Most importantly, they provide these managers with new opportunities
to advance the rapid globalisation of production process by allowing
them to disperse the activities of their corporations to locations that
offer the greatest cost and efficiency gains. It is important to note in
this respect the increasing tendency for international investment to be
directed at developing rather than developed countries. The total
amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) going to developing coun-
tries rose from US$25 billion in 1990 to more than US$90 billion in
1995, almost 40 percent of total FDI in 1995 (Table 2). The distribu-
tion of this international investment, however, has been largely un-
even. Most private capital flows have gone to countries which made
the greatest progress in macroeconomic stabilisation, improving the
investment climate and financial sector reform and at the same time
have a relatively large market and a good record of sustained econom-
ic growth. Table 2 adds details by listing the largest FDI recipient
regions in recent years.
Privatisation programmes in many developing countries, particular-
ly in transition economies and Latin America, have been the main
source of FDI flows. Between 1990 and 1995, they attracted more
TABLE 2. Net FDI in Developing Countries, 1990 and 1995 (US$ billion).
Region 1990 1995
All developing countries 25 90.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 2.2
East Asia & the Pacific 11 53.7
South Asia 0.5 2.0
Europe and Central Asia 2.1 12.5
Latin America & the Carribbean 7.8 17.8
Middle East & North Africa 2.8 2.1
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1996, p. 17.
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than US$40 billion in FDI. International investment associated with
‘‘greenfield’’ operations involving the creation of new facilities from
scratch has been very small, ranging from 10 to 20 percent of total FDI
over the same period (UNCTD: 1997: 31). The 1996 WB World Debt
Tables report predicts privatisation to continue to be the main source
of FDI flows to LDCs over the coming few years. International man-
agers that move quickly to take advantage of these opportunities are in
a better position to achieve a first mover advantage.
FDI, either via privatisation or ‘‘greenfield’’ operations, is not the
only approach available for international firms to penetrate the mar-
kets of developing countries which have embraced reform measures.
Trade liberalisation and deregulation can facilitate international trade
and therefore enhance the attractiveness of exports as an entry strate-
gy. Indeed, exports, facilitated by large reduction in tariffs and non-
tariff barriers in many countries in the region, and joint ventures, have
been the most popular approaches used by international firms to estab-
lish a presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) during
the 1990s (Strange: 1995). This trend, however, has been at the ex-
pense of FDI in the region, which declined slightly between 1990 and
1995 (Table 2).
Many countries in the MENA signed agreements with the IMF and
WB to reform their economies, like Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia,
Morocco and recently Algeria. The extent and pace of reform varied
considerably within and among these countries. In Jordan, for exam-
ple, despite large reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers, privatisa-
tion and property rights regulations are still non-existent despite more
than ten years of reform efforts. Many other measures which aimed at
promoting foreign investment in the country (like licensing system or
one-stop-shop) have either not been implemented or have been made
even more complex (WB: 1997: 4). This made it difficult for foreign
investors to establish wholly owned productive facilities in Jordan or
to buy privatised state enterprise. Therefore, foreign investors opted
for exports and joint ventures with a domestic partner to overcome
administrative difficulties and to enhance their access to the market.
The absence of property rights regulations and clear dispute settlement
mechanism, by increasing the costs of conducting international busi-
ness, have also reduced the attractiveness of licensing and franchising
agreements as a way to serve the Jordanian market.
Even in many countries where the pace and extent of market-ori-
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ented reform has been stronger and quicker than in Jordan, interna-
tional managers need to be aware of the significant cultural, social,
religious and political differences that exist between their own country
and the recipient state. Hill (1997: 31) has provided numerous exam-
ples of some American firms that incurred losses of millions of dollars
in many Eastern European countries for ignoring such differences.
In addition, international managers need to be aware of the fact that
signing a reform agreement with the IMF and WB does not mean that
the recipient government will implement or sustain all of the reforms.
The WB itself (World Bank: 1988) estimated that only around 60 per-
cent of the policy changes agreed as conditions of SALPs were fully
implemented, with implementation differing between policy areas
(McCleary: 1989: 32). Mosely et al. (1991: 139) based on a detailed
study of nine countries estimated average compliance to be lower at
only 54 percent.
To sum up, although recent changes and reforms in many develop-
ing countries offer international firms new opportunities, they also
involve high risks and new challenges. Signing an agreement with the
IMF and WB, on the one hand, and implementing the conditions
recommended by these agreements, on the other, are two completely
different things. Many developing countries lack the capacity to en-
force rules and regulations that are necessary to reduce risks and
challenges of conducting international business. The way in which
international business is conducted in developing countries is more
likely to differ from that in Western, industrialised, rich countries.
Managers who ignore these differences and issues do so at their own
peril.
JORDAN:
FROM BOOM TO BUST
In the 1950s and 1960s, ‘‘Jordan’s economic performance was by
any standard successful. . . . exceptional as compared with both the
Arab and international standards’’ (Al-Quaryoty: 1989: 164-5). Be-
tween 1952 and 1966, gross domestic product (GDP) at market price
grew by an annual average of 6.9% whilst gross national product
(GNP) grew at 7.5%. These were not bad rates for a country that not
only has limited natural resources and arable land, but also whose
potential looked extremely grim according to a WB mission to Jordan
Jane Harrigan and Hamed El-Said 73
in the mid-1950s (World Bank, 1957). However, by the 1980s the
Jordanian economy lost its exceptional performance. Instead, the
economy was suffering from very low growth rates, large trade and
fiscal deficits in addition to a heavy debt burden that made the country,
in terms of debt per capita, among the most indebted in the world.
Many analysts believe that the role of the state in the economy
during the 1950s and 1960s was limited, confined to the provision of
physical and social infrastructure, in addition to investment in capital-
intensive and risky projects, which the private sector would not fi-
nance (Sha’sha: 1991). The government’s strategy in the post-inde-
pendence period focused on import-substitution industrialisation (ISI),
particularly in simple manufactured products to reduce the heavy de-
pendence of the country on imports. However, it is often argued that
ISI in Jordan was neither hostile to private sector concerns nor was it
based on large public sector involvement, unlike ISI strategies imple-
mented by many other Arab states at that time (Richards and Water-
bury: 1996: 173-220). The private sector in Jordan remained the lead-
er, responsible for initiation of most projects in both industry and
agriculture. Although tariffs and direct restriction on imports were
used to protect domestic industry, the former was generally low while
the latter was kept at a minimal level (Sha’sha: 1991). Export-expan-
sion focused on the country’s mining sector in order to exploit Jor-
dan’s main resources of phosphates, cement and fertilisers (Jawhary:
1993: VII-24).
Accordingly, and mainly due to the analysis of the role of the state
in the economy during the 1950s and 1960s, many observers and
international institutions, including the IMF and WB, have viewed
Jordan as a free market economy, based on private enterprise, and with
a general economic environment that is receptive to the kind of poli-
cies promoted by the IMF and WB. Therefore, it was felt that a reform
‘‘programme prescribed by the international financial community un-
der adjustment programmes-privatisation, austerity measures, and a
free market economy- . . . . would not be painful’’ or difficult to
implement following the economic crisis in the late 1980s (Brand:
1992: 180).
However, the classification of Jordan as a ‘‘free market’’ economy,
based mainly on the immediate post-independence period, obscures
important development in Jordan’s political economy since the early
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1970s, which make the ‘‘free market’’ view of Jordan at best mislead-
ing.
Faced with declining popularity during the 1950s and 1960s, King
Hussein imposed martial law in the late 1950s and suspended the
parliament in the 1960s (Yorke: 1989: 3-86). When external inflows
rose in the early 1970s, Hussein seized the opportunity to enhance and
consolidate his domestic power base. This was to be done by promot-
ing ‘‘the role of the state . . . making Jordanians dependent on the state
largess . . . [and] buying acquiescence in Hashemite rule’’ (Fathi:
1993: 226). Two strategies, not uncommon to other developing coun-
tries, were pursued by Hussein to retain and enhance his power base.
The first was a popular, patrimonial appeal based on preserving and
protecting the interests of all Jordanians regardless of their origin.
Hence, on the ‘‘grounds of protecting consumers’’ from the inflation-
ary spiral of the 1970s, the state established a monopoly over the
importation and distribution of certain essential commodities like
wheat, flour, sugar, rice, meat, poultry and olive oil and fixed and
subsidised their prices and the prices of 40 other items (Anani: 1987:
134).
The public sector institutions and enterprises (PSEs) became an
important vehicle for patronage. Public sector employment was used
by the regime as a major tool in building political support in the
Kingdom (Daves: 1997: 3). The number of PSEs rose from 1 or 2 in
the early 1950s to 31 in the late 1980s. But this number largely under-
estimates the extent of state’s involvement and share in the economy.
The state invests indirectly in public shareholding companies through
the Jordan Investment Corporation, the government’s investment arm,
and Social Security Corporation. The WB estimated that in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the state controlled shareholding companies
accounted for over 85% of the assets of all listed services companies,
and over 60% of the assets of all listed manufacturers (WB: 1993: 73).
The second strategy through which Hussein sought to enhance his
power base was through a network of relationships with certain pri-
vate clients, known in Jordan as members of the ‘‘old merchant class’’
(Amawi: 1994: 162-86). The latter was dominant in the services sec-
tor, with large diversified interests in industry, finance and agribusi-
ness. This relationship resembled the classical feudal model, whereby
clients provided the regime with political support in return for selec-
tive economic benefits. Hence, monopolies, licensing and permit sys-
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tems were also introduced for the first time in the early 1970s to
preserve and protect the interests of certain groups from domestic and
foreign competition (Jawhary: 1993; and El-Said: 1996).
Unlike many of the NICs (see Mosely et al.: 1991: 41), the political
coalition which became dominant in Jordan in the 1970s and 1980s
was not built around the export sector. Rather, it was built on the
conferment of rents to certain barons concentrated mainly in services,
simple consumer goods, agribusiness and finance. These rents in-
cluded not only higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but also large
subsidies for electricity, water and energy; tax exemptions and other
financial incentives and largess. As Brand (1992: 169) wrote: ‘‘Such
rent payments have been critical to the regime’s consolidation and
survival’’ and enabled it ‘‘to buy legitimacy through distribution.’’
However, the detrimental effects of these policies were disguised by
the favourable influence of several exogenous factors during the
1970s and early 1980s, which helped to sustain the momentum of
relatively high growth established in the preceding decades. Four such
factors deserve special attention; the drastic increase in foreign assis-
tance and grants, mostly from Arab oil-rich states; the rapid increase
in Jordan’s agricultural exports as a result of regional oil boom in the
early and late 1970s; increased remittances from Jordanians working
in the Gulf oil-rich states; and finally, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war
in 1980 which increased Iraqi demand for Jordanian manufactured
products. By 1982, Iraq became Jordan’s major trading partner, re-
placing Saudi Arabia (Jreisat: 1989).
The deterioration in the external environment beginning in 1982-3,
in the form of a decline in grants, remittances and demand for Jorda-
nian exports, revealed the principal weaknesses of the Jordanian econ-
omy. A decade of prosperity was followed by 6 years of severe reces-
sion, culminating in a crisis in 1989. The main features of this crisis,
like elsewhere in the developing countries, were large and consistent
balance of payments deficit, including trade deficit, fiscal deficit, high
inflation and large public internal and external debt. The trade deficit
was aggravated by a slight appreciation for the already artificially over
valued exchange rate of the Jordanian Dinar, and by domestic indus-
tries’ failure to reduce their excessive dependence on imports of inter-
mediate and capital goods with no corresponding ability to increase
export earnings. Inflation and fiscal deficit were magnified by the
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massive losses of the PSEs facing ‘‘soft budget constraints’’ (Smadi:
1993: 116).
The response of the authorities to the deterioration in the external
environment was to follow an expansionary policy based on both
foreign and domestic borrowing in addition to running down reserves.
Total value of external debt rose from almost $1 billion in 1979 to $9.5
billion in 1989, while internal borrowing rose to $1.1 billion in the
same year (CBJ: 1990 Report: 44-7). Foreign reserves plummeted to
$68 million in August 1988, equivalent to about 10 days of commodi-
ty imports, down from $1.2 billion in 1979-81 (Kanovsky: 1989: 1). It
was Jordan’s inability to meet her external commitments for the first
time in the country’s recent history that precipitated the 1989 crisis.
MALAWI:
FROM BOOM TO BUST
At independence in 1964, Malawi, like Jordan, lacked capital and
skilled labour, had a small domestic market, limited mineral resources
and depended heavily on arable land (McCraken: 1983). The outlook
for the country was grim. Agriculture accounted for 55% of GDP, 90%
of domestic employment and the bulk of exports. The sector was
sub-divided into estates producing 43% of merchandise exports
(mainly tea and tobacco) and smallholders producing for subsistence,
providing a marketed surplus of food and producing export crops
amounting to 50% of merchandise exports.
In contrast to Jordan, post-independence Malawi pursued an export-
orientated agro-based development strategy with import substituting
industrialisation playing a secondary role and restricted to a narrow
range of consumer goods already afforded protection by the country’s
land-locked position. The overriding aim of the trade regime was to
stimulate agricultural exports. Tariffs were generally low, direct re-
strictions on imports minimal and exchange rate competitiveness was
maintained. A wages and incomes policy ensured the estate sector had
access to cheap labour and remained competitive. Foreign capital was
attracted in the form of direct foreign investment in estate agriculture
and manufacturing and in the form of donor grants and loans. This
inflow of capital contributed to the government’s ability to pursue
conservative fiscal and external payments policies through to the
mid-1970s.
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It is on the basis of the above type of summary description of the
post-independence development strategy that many commentators
have described Malawi as a free-market, non-interventionist, capitalist
economy (Acharya: 1978, 1981a,b; Agarwala: 1983; World Bank:
1983a). As with Jordan, therefore, the WB and IMF regarded Malawi
as a fertile ground for their neo-liberal pricist and state minimalist
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. We argue, however, that in
both Jordan and Malawi, the Washington institutions misinterpreted
the political economy, leading to inappropriate reform prescriptions.
In both countries the state played a larger role than many commenta-
tors believed and the resulting outcome can best be described as a
mixed economy.
Both countries were centralised, efficient, personal dictatorships in
the form of Life President Banda in Malawi and King Hussein in
Jordan, both of whom adopted their individual brand of patrimonial
populism appealing to all strata of society. The strength of Banda’s
regime enabled him to avoid the post-independence legitimacy crises
so common in Africa and allowed him to pursue his own vision of
development (Sandbrook: 1985; Short: 1974: 175).
In his mixed economy approach Banda used parastatals and large
holding companies, including his own giant Press Holdings, to pro-
mote estate agriculture and his populist political platform, resulting in
a wide range of state economic activity. Although often indirect and
difficult to detect this activity was pervasive. It was particularly preva-
lent in the agriculture sector where the state induced a severe bias
towards estate agriculture at the expense of smallholders. ADMARC,
the agricultural state marketing board, taxed smallholder production
and channeled the resulting surplus into the estates (Harrigan: 1988:
418). The state-led estate bias was also promoted by the complex
relationship between the corporate, parastatal and financial sectors of
the Malawian economy. The President’s Press Holdings had equity
interests in virtually every sphere of the economy, including majority
share holdings in the country’s two commercial banks. Two important
parastatals, ADMARC and the Malawi Development Corporation,
also held shares in the banks. Through the structure of these organisa-
tions’ interlocking directorates in which final authority resided in the
President (Mhone: 1987: 67), both ADMARC and the banks’ surplus
was channeled into estate agriculture with politicians and those loyal
to Banda given easy access to cheap loans to establish tobacco estates.
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Intervention was also prevalent in other parts of the economy. The
Government possessed considerable regulatory powers over all sizes
of enterprises and landholders facilitated by licensing arrangements,
which it used to stifle competition with Press Holdings. The non-trans-
parent system of foreign exchange allocation was also used to favour
Press and the parastatals, which grew to become large holding compa-
nies with extensive share holdings in Malawi’s supposedly private
sector. These hybrid organisations were expected to operate according
to commercial criteria and yet at the same time were expected to carry
out a range of developmental activities to bolster Banda’s populist
appeal. ADMARC, for example, was expected to maintain an exten-
sive network of rural markets providing subsidised inputs and offering
pan-territorial producer prices to all smallholders. Finally, as in Jor-
dan, the Government controlled the prices of over 60 goods in a bid to
maintain its populist appeal.
Banda’s export-orientated agricultural strategy, combined with his
personal brand of patrimonial populism, has resulted not in a paradigm
free market economy, but an economy which is so mixed that it is
often difficult to distinguish the private and public sectors. In the
words of a USAID mission analysing the private sector: ‘‘Malawi’s
private sector is alive, doing well, and owned by the Government’’
(Harrigan: 1991: 207).
In both countries patrimonial populism was combined with a classi-
cal feudal model incorporating clientelism and rent-seeking, although
the latter was more prevalent in Jordan. Favoured producers were
protected from competition, loyalists were provided with employment
in state enterprises and parastatals, and politicians were given favour-
able access to loans. The difference between the two countries was
that in the case of Malawi the system was built around the agricultural
export sector whilst in Jordan it revolved around an import substitut-
ing manufacturing sector.
Malawi, like Jordan, enjoyed a rapid rate of growth through to the
late 1970s. A large rise in investment and domestic savings was ac-
companied by a real GDP growth rate of 5.5% per annum between
1967 and 1979. This growth was led by the favoured estate agriculture
whose output grew at over 17% per annum whilst the smallholder
sector remained sluggish. As a result, smallholder contributions to
export earnings declined and export revenues became increasingly
dependent on estate production of tobacco and tea.
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Performance in terms of government accounts was also satisfactory
with the central government deficit remaining below 10% of GDP
throughout most of the period (Table 3). Balance of payments perfor-
mance also gave little cause for alarm prior to 1977 with exports
buoyant on the trade account, substantial remittances from migrant
labour working in the mining and commercial agricultural sector of
neighboring countries supporting the factor and non-factor service
account and inflows of donor grants and loans boosting the capital
account. As a result foreign currency reserves grew.
By the late 1970s, however, a series of severe adverse exogenous
shocks eventually brought growth to a halt and exposed structural
weaknesses of economy. This took the form of a dramatic deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade (particularly in tobacco prices which ac-
counted for 54% of export earnings by the late 1970s), drought condi-
tions in 1979-80, and disruption of the traditional trade route to the sea
due to civil war in Mozambique.
The response of the Malawian authorities to the adverse external
environment was remarkably similar to the response of the Jordanian
authorities. Both countries followed expansionary fiscal policies based
TABLE 3. Malawi Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 1970-80
Pre-reform Analysis
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
GDP growth rate 0.47 16.23 6.22 2.29 6.13 4.18 5.83 9.07 6.99 5.11 0.23
Total investment
as % of GDP 26.10 19.40 24.70 22.70 24.00 28.40 16.40 21.90 37.30 30.70 21.80
Domestic savings
as % of GDP 13.30 9.30 12.20 13.70 13.60 10.10 10.70 17.60 20.90 15.10 10.90
Central government
budget deficit




(MK millions) n.a. 5.50 7.30 --1.00 --3.30 18.00 17.20  9.30 25.00 27.20 62.60
Balance-of-payments
current account deficit
as % of GDP 10.22 7.88 10.53 7.84 7.04 12.88 9.82 6.71 16.81 19.61 16.77
Source: World Bank (1982) statistical appendix, Tables 2.01, 2.02, 2.04, 9.10; IMF, Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
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on foreign borrowing and running down foreign reserves. Economic
controls, in the form of tariffs and quotas, were also intensified in both
countries in a vain attempt to protect the balance of payments and to
protect local producers from recession whilst the real exchange rate was
allowed to appreciate. This only encouraged extensive and inefficient use
of high cost imports, hence, worsening the position of external accounts.
A similar response to the adverse international environment occurred in
many other developing countries (Mosely et al.: 1995).
The most indicative signs of the economic crisis in Malawi were
burgeoning external and internal imbalances. External current account
deficits reached 19.6% of GDP in 1979 (Table 3). Government expen-
ditures, used to protect the population from recession and also to
subsidise increased losses of parastatals, rose considerably in this peri-
od, resulting in a budget deficit of 15.6% of GDP in 1981 (Table 4). As
TABLE 4. Malawi Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 1980-6
Post-reform Analysis
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
GDP growth rate
at 1978 factor cost of
which:  0.4  5.2 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.3  0.3
Agriculture total  6.5  8.1 6.4 4.4 5.4 1.1 0.1
Smallholders  8.5  8.9 2.5 3.7 7.2 1.2 0.4
Estates 3.3 4.9 22.4 7.1 0.8 0.6  1.1
Manufacturing 0.3 3.6  0.3 7.1 2.4 0.5 5.3
Central government
revenue as % of GDP 18.9 20.0 19.6 19.9 20.7 21.9 21.4
Central government
expenditure as % of GDP 34.3 35.6 32.2 30.1 29.5 31.8 34.6
Central government
deficit as % of GDP  13.9  15.6  12.5  10.2  8.8  10.0  13.2
Exports 21.6 0.5  13.3 2.8 23.2  19.3  2.6
Imports 9.1  19.6  11.8  0.9  11.5 1.0  0.1
Balance-of-payments
current account deficit  24.3  15.5  12.6  11.8  1.4  8.2  6.9
as % of GDP
Debt service ratio 21.9 n.a. 23.3 21.5 21.4 29.5 40.1
Gross domestic
investment as % of GDP 24.5 17.7 21.5 22.8 13.9 17.9 10.1
Source: Government of Malawi, ‘Economic Report, 1987’.
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revenue failed to keep pace with the growth in expenditures, the gov-
ernment resorted to both domestic and international borrowing. Be-
tween 1977-80, Malawi’s publicly guaranteed debt more than doubled
and the debt service ratio increased from 7% to 19%.
Moreover, Press Holdings, ADMARC and the Malawi Develop-
ment Corporation, all undercapitalised, faced a liquidity crisis which
threatened the viability of the domestic banking system, the govern-
ment budget and the country’s external creditworthiness (Gulhati,
1989: 17). The viability of the banking system was also threatened by
bad debts in the poorly managed and highly geared tobacco estate
sector following the 1979 collapse of tobacco prices.
The severe internal and external imbalances afflicting the Malawian
economy in the late 1970s rapidly translated into declining investment
levels and growth rate. By 1981 gross fixed capital formation had
fallen to half the 1979 level and was substantially below the level
needed to maintain the country’s capital stock. The downturn in in-
vestment, particularly in the private sector, had a marked impact on
GDP growth, which declined from 5.1% in 1979 to  0.4% in 1980
(Table 4). It was under these circumstances that the Government ap-
proached the IMF in 1979 and World Bank in 1980 for a series of
stabilisation and structural adjustment loans.
JORDAN:
THE IMF AND WB DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
Jordan’s negotiations with the IMF started in March 1989. One
month later, a short-term stand-by agreement, lasting 18 months and
worth SDR 60 Million, to stabilise the macro-economy was con-
cluded. This was followed by a medium-term, 1989-93, structural
adjustment lending programme (SALP) with the WB for the value of
$150 million. However, the Gulf crisis caused interruption of the
programme implementation which was, therefore, terminated in 1990
(CBJ: 1990 Report: 71). Negotiations with the IMF and WB resumed
in late 1991. In February 1992, a new short-term stabilisation pro-
gramme, lasting 24 months for the amount of SDR 44.4 million, and a
WB medium to long-term SAL for 1992-8 were announced. The Jor-
danian authorities’ efforts at structural reform were further supported
by two other short-term, 18 months each, Extended Fund Facility
(EFF) programmes, usually provided to lower-income developing
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countries, in 1994 and 1996 for the amount of SDR 189 million and
SDR 200 million, respectively. At the same time, the WB extended,
between 1992 and 1998, three general structural adjustment loans and
eight sector loans SECALs totaling more than $1.57 billion; only
Turkey ever qualified for such a huge financial support when it re-
ceived $1.6 billion from the WB between 1980-84 (CBJ: Annual
Reports between 1992 and 1998; Al-Fanik: September 1997: 5; for
Turkey, see Kirkpatrick and Onis: 1991: 14). Clearly, Jordan, for
reasons discussed later in this paper, had been given ‘‘a special treat-
ment by the IMF’’ and WB (Al-Fanik: 1992: 8).
The IMF and the WB rightly diagnosed the main structural weak-
nesses of the Jordanian economy to include the following: limited
resource base and weak productive structure; high dependence on
imports leading to chronic trade deficit, the latter being exacerbated by
narrow export base, dominated by phosphates, fertilisers and potash;
dominance of services sector, particularly government services which
accounted for more than two-thirds of GDP at factor cost in 1992
leading to a chronic fiscal deficit; and geographical concentration of
exports in the region, particularly in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which
together accounted for more than 65 percent of Jordan’s total value of
exports since the late 1970s (Maciejeski and Mansur, 1996: 2; WB:
1993: 44).
Policy prescriptions involved a close working relationship between
the IMF and WB. A clear understanding of the division of responsibi-
lities between the two institutions appeared to be a significant feature
of the Jordanian reform programme. The IMF’s conditionalities fo-
cused on monetary and fiscal policy and public sector financial man-
agement. This implied mainly reducing fiscal deficit via both expendi-
ture-reduction, particularly subsidies for production and consumption,
and revenue-enhancement. The latter would include reforming both
direct and indirect tax systems, and introduction of a new general sales
tax (GST) that would broaden the tax base, increase its elasticity and
efficiency and reduce excessive dependence on trade related taxes. To
control inflation and improve domestic savings and quality of invest-
ment, credit ceilings on government borrowing in addition to achiev-
ing positive domestic interest rates in real terms were among key
requirements of the IMF’s conditionalities.
The WB was more concerned with improving domestic and foreign
competition and institutional efficiencies. Therefore, it focused, first
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and foremost, on trade liberalisation, which was seen as the main key
to promote foreign competition long blocked by high tariffs and non-
tariff barriers. Financial and banking sector reform and deregulation
ranked second in the list of the WB SALP. This, it was hoped, would
enhance access of small business to capital and credit which is imped-
ed by bias in favour of large, politically connected businesses. Public
sector reform, including retrenchment, commercialisation and priva-
tisation of PSEs was the third and lowest priority of the WB SALP
(Maciejewski and Mansur: 1996: 10-12; WB: 1993: X-XI). This se-
quence stemmed mainly from the WB’s vision and classification of
Jordan as non-interventionist, based on limited public sector involve-
ment in the economy. Hence, public sector reform was not the imme-
diate concern and priority, an assumption, which actually undermined
reform efforts as will be seen later. The government of Jordan, howev-
er, ‘‘promised to implement these policies and measures through a
specific period over the duration of the programme’’ 1992-98 (Jaradat:
1994: 56).
The general objective of reform in Jordan did not differ much from
their objective in other developing countries, namely, restoration of
‘‘balance of payments viability at an early date while attaining satis-
factory growth performance in the context of stable domestic prices
and increasing the role of the private sector in the economy’’ (Macie-
jewski and Mansur: 1996: 10). No reference whatsoever was made to
the social aspects of reform, a factor which undermined reform mea-
sures, as will be demonstrated later.
MALAWI:
THE IMF AND WB DIAGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS
Malawi opened negotiations with the IMF in 1979, exactly ten
years before Jordan. Just as Jordan’s first stand-by loan of 1989 was
disrupted by exogenous shocks, namely the Gulf War, so Malawi’s
was suspended due to exogenous shocks in the form of drought and
civil war in neighboring Mozambique, which disrupted access to the
sea. Malawi’s negotiations with the IMF resumed in 1980. Between
1980-90 the IMF disbursed three stand-by loans, one Extended Fund
Facility (SDR 100 million) and one Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (US$75 million). In the same period the WB disbursed three
SALs (totaling US$253.5 million including bi-lateral co-financing)
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and two Sector Adjustment Loans to the trade and industry and the
agricultural sectors (totaling US$235 million including bi-lateral co-
financing). Like Jordan, Malawi was a favoured recipient of WB
loans. In the first half of the 1980s only Turkey exceeded Malawi’s
three consecutive SALs.
The WB and IMF identified six structural weaknesses in the Mala-
wian economy, several of which were identical to the Jordanian diag-
nosis. Identical diagnoses included the narrowness of the export base,
in particular the increased reliance on tobacco in the case of Malawi,
and an over-extended government including increasing budget defi-
cits, deterioration in parastatal finances and an inflexible system of
government administered prices and wages. Other problems unique to
Malawi were the slow growth of smallholder exports and dependence
on imported fuel and declining stocks of domestic firewood.
The WB’s policy reform conditions were targeted at five general
objectives: improving the balance of payments; adjusting price incen-
tives and incomes policy; strengthening resource management; ration-
alising the government investment programme; and institutional im-
provements. Under the balance of payments heading most of the
emphasis was placed on increasing smallholder export crop produc-
tion to be achieved by increasing ADMARC’s purchase prices to
export parity level. To improve the government budget subsidies were
to be removed, including the subsidy on smallholder fertiliser. Other
reform conditions included consumer price decontrol, measures to
increase government revenue and the restructuring of Press Holdings
and ADMARC.
In some respects the WB’s reform conditions differed between Ma-
lawi and Jordan. Unlike Jordan, the Malawian programme did not
place great emphasis on trade liberalisation to increase competition
neither did it focus on financial sector reform. Both programmes,
however, had similar objectives: to restore balance of payments viabil-
ity in the context of growth and a stable macro-environment. Both also
had a common weakness: the neglect of social aspects of the adjust-
ment programme. This was a fairly universal feature of adjustment
programmes like Malawi’s in the early 1980s (UNICEF, 1987) but
was atypical of the Jordanian experience in the 1990s by which time
social considerations were generally incorporated into WB adjustment
programmes.
The IMF prescriptions for Malawi were almost identical to those
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introduced in Jordan a decade later. They consisted of a range of
short-term demand management measures: government expenditure
restraint; measures to increase government revenues including in-
creased excises, import and petroleum duties; increased interest rates
and ceilings on total domestic credit, including ceilings on govern-
ment credit and on external borrowing. The next section looks more
closely at the main weaknesses and deficiencies of the IMF and WB
programmes in Malawi.
JORDAN:
PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY
UNDER REFORM MEASURES
The agreements with the IMF and WB were accompanied by a
marked improvement in the Jordanian macroeconomic indicators, at
least until 1995: Real GDP at market prices improved rapidly, register-
ing an average growth of 7.8% between 1992-95, before declining to a
paltry 1.5% in 1996-7. Gross fixed investment averaged more than
32% of GDP at market prices between 1992-97; current and trade
deficits along with inflation declined rapidly over the same period.
External debt also followed suite, declining from 193.5% of GDP in
market prices in 1990 to almost 92% in 1997 (Table 5).
According to the IMF and WB, which expressed satisfaction with
Jordan’s commitment level and implementation of their conditionali-
ties, all the policy actions contemplated in the programme were imple-
mented, leading to this ‘‘remarkable success’’ of stabilisation and
structural adjustment (Maciejewski and Mansur: 1996: 2 and 7). The
IMF Managing Director, Michael Camdessus, went further to state
‘‘Jordan had gone beyond the conditions set by the IMF’’ (Al-Fanik:
August 1997: 2). A Jordanian source stated that ‘‘Jordan was success-
ful in achieving over 90% of the objectives’’ (Al-Fanik: June 1997: 2).
However, correlation does not mean causation. The fact that the
IMF and WB programmes were accompanied by an improvement in
Jordan’s macro economy does not mean that they caused this improve-
ment. Although Jordan implemented many of the conditions stipulated
by the IMF and WB, empirical evidence suggests that this imple-
mentation neither amounted to over 90% of the total conditionalities
nor has it been solely responsible for the overall improvement in the
economy. There are also important independent government policies
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TABLE 5. Jordan: Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 1989-97
Pre-reform analysis During and post reform analysis
INDICATOR 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Real GDP
Growth rate at
Market Price %  3.9 1.7 4.7 1.12 5.8 8.5 5.9 0.8 2.2
AS % OF GDP AT MARKET PRICE
Fiscal Deficit  15.6  9.9  7.7  1.4  3.1  6.1  5.5  7.7  6.8
Expenditure 38.8 39.5 39.6 36.4 37.3 34.0 34.0 37.5 35.0
Current      29.7 29.8 30.4 28.9
Capital      6.5 7.2 7.6 6.5
Revenues 23.2 29.5 31.9 37.8 34.1 29.5 31.4 30.0 28.5
Gross Invest. 25.8 28.8 24.0 32.1 30.1 33.0 31.8 3.4 33.6
Private 15.0 15.0 16.0 24.2 23.0    
Public   8.0 7.9 7.1    
Current Account 4.1  10.0  8.4  23.6  19.6  12.0  8.8  9.4  5.5
Trade Deficit 22.9 38.6 33.8 42.5 44.1 32.3 29.1 36.8 32.1
Internal debt 941 868 858 262 341 1675 1414 1459 1457*
($M)
External debt 6611.0 7615.5 7346.0 6624.6 6008.0 6288.0 6472.3 6844.6 6637.7
% GDP 148.6 193.5 179.9 139.1 115.8 102.9 96.7 99.2 91.6
Inflation ** 25.8% 16.1% 8.2% 4.0% 3.3% 3.6% 2.3% 6.5% 3.0%
Reserve ($M) 52 221 825 769 595 438 439 716 1740
 Not available. * First ten months of 1998. ** Measured by price index
Sources: CBJ: October 1994; Jaradat: 1994:177-81; CBJ: Annual reports between 1994-7.
and other more significant exogenous factors, which contributed
largely to this marked improvement in economic performance. On the
other hand, the government had taken a number of counterproductive
steps, neglected by the IMF and WB, perhaps deliberately, which
actually undermined reform measures altogether.
In fact, improvement in macroeconomy was dramatic and immedi-
ate, starting in 1990-1, before the second agreement of 1992 was
signed and during the period when the first agreement of 1989 was
terminated (Table 5). This immediate improvement contradicts the
general experience of such programmes, which usually, according to
the WB itself, take two to three years before their positive effects
emerge (WB: 1993). A number of factors occurred in the late 1980s
and early 1990s that largely contributed to this favourable outcome.
These factors are the subject of the following sub-sections.
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Growth and Investment
In 1990 the Gulf crisis broke out, following Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait. The crisis had major effects on Jordan, particularly the expul-
sion and return of more than 300,000 Jordanians from Kuwait and
other Gulf States as the latter were unsatisfied with Jordan’s handling
of the crisis. However, the returnees brought back with them their life
savings, estimated by domestic sources at $3-4 billion (Daves: 197:
13).
With little hope left for the returnees to go back to their previous
jobs in the Gulf, they invested their savings in Jordan, mostly in
constructing houses and offices, causing a construction-led boom. The
1992 Central Bank of Jordan Report (p. 14) admitted that ‘‘the return
of the huge numbers of expatriates and their demand for housing
spurred this growth.’’ As the construction boom came to an end
around 1995, growth rates deteriorated rapidly, registering 0.8% in
1996 and 2.2% in 1997 (Table 5). High growth rates were also stimu-
lated by resumption in foreign grants and loans in the early 1990s, as
will be seen later.
However, high growth in the early 1990s, not unlike high growth
rates in the 1970s and early 1980s, ‘‘has been achieved with little
growth in total factor productivity . . . Past growth has been the result
of a mere increase in inputs, capital and labour’’ at the expense of
resource efficiency which declined most rapidly in the post-1990 peri-
od (WB; 1993: 15; and McDermott: 1996: 17). The country’s past
experience has clearly shown that high growth rates cannot be sus-
tained without efficiency improvements.
The low productivity of the economy is also evident in the unusual-
ly high level of investment with low growth rates in 1996-7. Total
investment exceeded, on average, 32% of GDP in market prices be-
tween 1992-97, including 1996 and 1997 when the real GDP regis-
tered zero and low growth rate of 2.2%, respectively. This finding is
confirmed by a WB study which found that the efficiency of invest-
ment and of resource use in Jordan, as measured by the Incremental
Capital-Output Ratio, was much lower in the early 1990s than it had
been during the 1950s and 1970s through to the early 1980s (WB:
1993: 25-38). Growth in the latter period, it is worth noting, was still
higher than growth achieved under the IMF and WB programmes
during 1989-97.
It is also important to note here that the improved investment per-
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formance in Jordan during 1992-97 contradicts the general experience
of the IMF and WB programmes in many other developing countries
as discussed earlier. Higher investment levels in Jordan came mostly
from domestic private investors, stimulated mainly by the returnees’
savings and investments, rather than by the IMF and WB programmes.
Trade and Public Sector Reforms
The WB, as argued earlier, gave reforming the trade sector a top
priority. A programme of gradual tariff reform was launched in 1989.
The maximum tariff rate (MTR) was reduced from more than 300%
for all non-luxury imports to 60% in 1990 and to 50% in the second
phase of tariff reform in 1994. Also, the percentage of imports subject
to quantitative restrictions was reduced from 40% in 1988 to 7% in
August 1990. Export promotion polices were enhanced, including
drawback system, bond warehouses, enhanced access to credit and
free zone areas (CBJ: Annual Reports between 1990-97; and Macie-
jewski and Mansur: 1996: 9 and 11).
On the surface, these reforms may suggest that Jordan had made
enormous progress with regard to liberalising and improving competi-
tion in the domestic economy. But a more in-depth analysis of trade
developments suggests that other factors lay behind trends in the ex-
ternal accounts.
First, a large part of improvement in the trade deficit in Jordan in
1989 came from almost 50% nominal devaluation of the JD by the
authorities in late 1988 and early 1989, prior to signing SALPs with
the IMF and WB (Kanovsky: 1989: 2). Export growth was also stimu-
lated by resumption of exports to Iraq after a short interruption during
1990-2, not due to Jordan’s ability to penetrate new markets. Iraq
today continues to be Jordan’s major trading partner as it was just prior
to the Gulf crisis.
Growth in exports, however, has been more than offset by larger
growth in imports, particularly following the return of more than 300,000
Jordanians between 1990-93, hence increasing the trade deficit during
this period. The deficit declined temporarily between 1994-95, ‘‘due
to disappearance of the impact of increase in imports due to returnees
and anticipation of tariff reduction’’ following SAL II in mid-1994
(CBJ: 1994 Report: 7). Domestic producers used accumulated stocks
from previous years. However, trade liberalisation increased the trade
deficit by facilitating more imports in 1996-7.
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SALPs, to the dismay of the IMF and WB, also failed to diversify
exports. Traditional exports, particularly phosphates, fertilisers, ce-
ment and potash, continue to dominate Jordan’s export structure, com-
prising 68.5% of total exports in 1996. Arab countries also remain the
major recipients of Jordanian exports (CBJ: 1996: 95).
Finally, and most importantly, tariff reduction occurred only where
‘‘domestic output is virtually non-existent . . . import competing goods
still enjoy considerable tariff protection through higher tariff on final
goods . . . In many cases, tariff reduction took place in areas where
there had been plenty of ‘water’ in the system, and many manufactur-
ers are still producing goods under the protection of tariffs in excess of
50.2%’’ (WB: 1993: 53, 58 and 64).
As a result, the trade system continued to be biased in favour of the
domestic market, despite export promotion measures aimed at termi-
nating this bias. Before signing SAL II in 1994, the WB demanded a
‘‘down payment’’ before further funds were disbursed, that is, an
implementation of certain reform measures before the agreement was
signed (CBJ: 1993 Report: 107). But in April 1994, the US began to
re-qualify its support for the Jordanian regime, following the 1994
peace treaty with Israel. The US government had openly played a role
in assembling the financial package which accompanied SAL II in
1994 and SAL III in 1996, particularly at a time when the govern-
ment’s performance was clearly going off track. Following his unpre-
cedented visit to the country in October 1994, President Clinton fin-
ished his address in the Jordanian Parliament by the strong words ‘‘we
shall not let you down’’ (Al-Fanik: February 1998: 2). After the peace
treaty, grants and loans became less conditional, with some being
disbursed in advance of reform. The US also interceded with other
creditors to provide Jordan with easier access to foreign market assis-
tance, including Japan and the EEC. Since 1995, Jordan has received
the highest amount of development aid per capita worldwide. This
‘‘peace dividend’’ not only ‘‘softened’’ the conditionality of aid and
loans, but also ‘‘crosscut reform efforts such as deregulation,’’ liberal-
isation and privatisation (Wils: 1998: 1-2 and 7). Since 1994, the trade
sector has undergone only very minor changes and, therefore, contin-
ues to be biased in favour of the small domestic economy at the
expense of exports.
One of the main weaknesses of the WB liberalisation programme is
that it focused on increasing foreign competition through trade liberal-
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isation without simultaneous attempts to reform the public sector,
which actually represented the main obstacle to domestic and foreign
competition in the economy. As Daves (1997: 18) noted: ‘‘no other
area of the Jordanian economy needs reform more than the. . . . state
sector.’’
Rather than deregulation and opening up the economy, the latter
was actually being subjected to an even higher degree of state restric-
tions and controls. This was mainly carried out through the intensifica-
tion of licensing and permits systems, in addition to continuation of
monopolies in certain sectors and undue red-tape measures that con-
tinue to protect certain powerful interest groups and hence limit com-
petition (WB: 1997). The upshot here was that the inflow of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) into Jordan remained small, limited and even
declined from 8.5% of GDP in 1990 to 5.5% in 1995 (WB: 1997: 3;
Daves: 1997: 4-5).
Progress with public sector reform has been the slowest of all re-
forms, successfully blocked by what Niblock (1993: 56-7) called the
‘‘bourgeoisie-bureaucratic state in Jordan,’’ with no interest in reforms
along the lines prescribed by the IMF and WB. Privatisation, for
example, remains almost non-existent, limited to the establishment of
a Ministerial Committee and to selling government shares in the Jor-
dan Holiday Inn Hotels Company. Rather than retrenchment, the pub-
lic sector actually grew bigger in terms of both employment and share
of ownership in the domestic economy (Daves: 1997: 3 and 18; and
CBJ: 1996: 26). Even the IMF Managing Director, Michael Camdes-
sus, admitted recently that ‘‘We were a little disappointed with the
slow pace in the privatisation process’’ in Jordan (Jordan Times: 1997:
7). This lack of privatisation and the increased role of the public sector
has limited the scope for international business managers to penetrate
the Jordanian economy.
Fiscal and Monetary Reform
There is a general agreement among observers and officials from
the IMF and WB that reforms in the monetary and fiscal sectors have
been strongest. Substantial progress has been made in this area. The
Jordanian authorities followed a tight monetary policy since 1992.
This included a policy of credit rationing through high and positive
interest rates and requiring banks to maintain high reserve ratios on
deposit with the central bank. It also included measures to contain
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public expenditure, and credit ceilings on internal and external public
borrowing (Maciejewski and Mansur: 1996).
However, the improvement in the fiscal deficit, which accompanied
these measures, did not come mostly from a reduction in expenditures.
Fiscal spending, especially current spending, remained high, exceed-
ing on average 35% of GDP at market prices between 1989-97 (Table
5). To be fair, the government did reduce, reluctantly and gradually,
direct subsidies on a number of basic food items and raised the prices
of public utilities, particularly energy, water and electricity. But it also
took measures to protect losers from these policies, which were in
stark violation of agreement with the IMF and WB. For example, a
series of increase in wages and salaries for both in service and retired
government officials, civil servants, and military personnel was imple-
mented in 1993, 1995, 1996 and January and October 1998 (CBJ:
1993 Report: 5; 1995 Report: 24-5 and 76; 1996 Report: 79; and
Al-Ra’i: 1998: 1).
In addition, the government resorted to indirect subsidies, through
the National Aid Fund (NAF), which provides direct cash assistance to
the needy families. By 1997, the NAF increased its direct assistance to
JD 23 million, a sum which is almost equivalent to the savings made
from reduction in direct subsidies since 1992. The prices of rice, sugar,
bread and powdered milk, particularly for the poor families, continue
to be subsidised indirectly through the coupon system introduced in
1990 (CBJ: 1996 Report: 79; Mansur: 1996: 62).
These measures should be understood in terms of the IMF/WB
programmes’ failure to address the social aspect of reform. The latter
hurt most the main supporters of regime, located in the public sector
institutions, civil service and the army. An IMF official admitted that
reforms actually worsened the unemployment situation, and increased
both inequalities and the number of people living under the poverty
line in Jordan (Mansur: 1996: 56-65). It was not surprising therefore
that the regime, after the 1989 riots which followed agreement with
the IMF, promised more subsidies and compensation (Kanovsky:
1989: 65).
Nor can the increase in domestic revenues, which was mainly re-
sponsible for improving the fiscal deficit, be attributed solely to the
IMF/WB programmes. The GST, which was a key stipulation by the
IMF, was introduced in June 1994, after being blocked by domestic
industrialists for more than two years (CBJ: 1994 Report: 82; El-Said:
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1996: Chapter Seven). Improvement in domestic revenues occurred
mostly between 1990-93, and the introduction of the GST in 1994 was
actually followed by a reduction in the share of domestic revenues,
reflecting continuation of exemptions and privileges.
Domestic revenues increased mainly as a result of independent
government policies aimed at addressing domestic crisis in 1988-9,
which included new taxes on restaurants, air tickets and departure,
sales of real estate, and permit fees for foreign workers; higher regis-
tration fees for cars and allowing exemption from national service in
return for cash payments of JD 5000 (Jaradat: 1993: 81-6; Kanovsky:
1989: 26-7). A 10% increase in the total population between 1990-93
as a result of the return of more than 300,000 Jordanians following the
Gulf crisis also increased domestic revenues rapidly. In 1990, the
government imposed a new tax on the cars of the returnees and their
furniture, which, according to the Central Bank, contributed largely to
the rise in domestic revenues in 1990-2 (CBJ: 1992 Report: 4).
Public Debt Management and Reserves
The most striking feature of Jordan’s adjustment efforts is its ability
to reduce both external and internal debt levels and at the same time
increase foreign reserves within a very short period of time (Table 5).
There is little doubt that the tight monetary policies implemented by
the authorities during 1989-94, including ceilings on public debt,
played an important role in preventing public debt from increasing to
higher levels. They also helped in bringing down the budget and
current account deficits, and, therefore, helped the government not to
resort to inflationary policies. A series of debt rescheduling in con-
junction with the 1989 and 1992 programmes helped avert the drain-
age of the CBJ’s foreign reserves.
However, debt rescheduling alone does not reduce the level of debt.
It only delays payments to some point in the future when the country
is, hopefully, in a better position to resume repayments. Rather than
waiting for that point to arrive, a ‘‘shift in overall debt strategy’’
occurred in Jordan. The authorities moved to take advantage of the
opportunity presented to it during 1992-3, particularly following the
international financial crisis of the early 1990s. This was the ability of
commercial banks to dispose of their claims on Jordan at substantial
discounts. In early 1993, Jordan was able to buyback a total amount of
$600 million owed to commercial banks at a cost of only $115 million.
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In 1992, financially starved Russia also accepted a similar buyback
arrangement which enabled Jordan to extinguish a total of $614 mil-
lion of Russian debt for only $88 million cash and some installments
in the form of commodity exports (Alonso-Gamo: 1996: 52-2).
Jordan’s ability to finance its debt buyback agreements was en-
hanced by the resumption of soft loans and grants in the early 1990s,
particularly from the Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group
(GCFCG), including the USA, Japan and EEC. It was estimated that
between 1989-92 alone, Jordan received almost $1 billion in soft loans
and grants from the GCFCG, Saudi Arabia, and the WB (CBJ: 1990:
68: Jaradat: 1993: 58; Kanovsky: 1989: 66).
Another debt rescheduling agreement took place in 1994, following
the peace treaty with Israel and the IMF EFF. Under this agreement,
creditors granted Jordan even more favourable terms than under either
the 1989 or 1992 agreements. In fact, ‘‘These terms were being ap-
plied for the first time to a lower middle-income country’’ (Alonso-
Gamo: 1996: 51). These exceptional terms reflect strong backing by
the US, which also wrote off $700 million of Jordan’s debt in 1994
following the peace treaty with Israel (Al-Fanik: February 1998: 2).
It is important to note here, however, that both public internal and
external debt has been rising steadily since 1994 in absolute terms. It
seems that the monetary and fiscal discipline of the earlier period has
been lost. The government has increasingly resorted to internal and
external borrowing to finance increase in current and fiscal deficits
caused mainly by a rise in current expenditure.
MALAWI:
PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY
UNDER REFORM MEASURES
Compliance and Macroeconomic Performance
Compared to many other SAL and IMF programme recipients Ma-
lawi was fairly compliant with the Washington institutions’ condition-
ality. The exception was the Malawi government’s violation of agri-
cultural price conditions in the early and mid-1980s. In both Malawi
and Jordan compliance was facilitated by a number of factors, includ-
ing the highly centralised nature of a dictatorial political regime; close
working relationship between the WB and IMF, including the use of
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cross conditionalities; and, in the case of Malawi, by the lack of strong
interest groups and the fact that Banda’s regime was not highly depen-
dent on a rent-seeking political economy, except in the estate sector
which was largely ignored during adjustment.
Like Jordan, the early years of adjustment in Malawi were also
associated with improved macroeconomic performance. Between
1982-84, for instance, there was a significant recovery in GDP growth
rates and exports and a decline in both the balance of payments current
account deficit and the fiscal deficit (Table 4). Malawi’s recovery was
not sustained into the mid-1980s. There was a sharp decline in GDP
and export growth rates, a failure to permanently reduce the govern-
ment budget deficit, a chronic decline in investment levels and a
deterioration of the debt service ratio. Table 4 shows that in terms of
most macroeconomic indicators, with the exception of the balance of
payments current account deficit, performance in 1986 was no better
than at the start of the adjustment programme in 1980. Of particular
concern was the decline in overall investment, which fell to 10% of
GDP in 1986 compared to 25% in 1980. This is in clear contrast to
Jordan where, contrary to many adjustment experiences elsewhere in
the developing world, investment remained high during the reform
period.
Not unlike Jordan, external factors, government independent poli-
cies and inappropriate prescriptions by the IMF and WB have also
affected the macro performance of the Malawi economy. The follow-
ing sub-sections look at these factors in more detail.
Agriculture
The WBs reform programme in Malawi placed heavy emphasis on
smallholder agriculture and paid much more attention to the agricul-
tural sector than in Jordan. This is in keeping with more general
observations, which show that agriculture sector conditionality under
SAPs was much more prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere
in the developing world (World Bank: 1987). The WB’s Malawian
reforms focused heavily on agricultural pricing policies with condi-
tions to increase smallholder export crop prices towards export parity
levels whilst suppressing the relative producer price of maize. Fertilis-
er and other input subsidies were also to be removed.
The WB’s policies in this area can be faulted in five respects. Firstly,
the exclusive emphasis on smallholder export crops failed to appreci-
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ate and reconcile the direct conflict with the government’s food self-
sufficiency objective. As a result compliance with these conditions
was erratic. In direct violation of SAL I conditionality maize producer
prices were raised by nearly 70% in the 1981-82 season and by 36% in
1987-88. This was a major factor in the temporary recovery in small-
holder growth rates with improved farmer incomes also leading to
buoyancy in the manufacturing sector. Drought in neighbouring coun-
tries in the early 1980s enabled Malawi to temporarily increase its
maize exports, hence, improving the performance of the economy.
In the interim period WB conditionality was complied with- export
crop prices were significantly increased while the real and relative
producer price of maize was allowed to fall and fertiliser subsidies
were gradually removed until the government U-turn of 1987. As a
result of these pricing policies sales of export crops (tobacco, rice,
groundnuts and cotton) to ADMARC more than doubled. ADMARC’s
purchase of maize, however, fell by 59% confirming government fears
and necessitating costly food imports. Adverse exogenous shocks in
the mid-1980s, namely a renewed decline in the terms of trade,
drought, inability to secure further debt service rescheduling, external
transport disruption and an influx of Mozambican refugees, aggra-
vated Malawi’s economic malaise.
Secondly, the WB’s excessive emphasis on export crop prices and
subsidy removal exacerbated the food crop versus export crop con-
flict. The emphasis on pricing instruments ignored the need for non-
price policies to support smallholder production and to increase the
productivity of food crop production, included in the subsistence sec-
tor, to ensure that land could be released for export crops without
jeopardising food self-sufficiency. The WB was over-optimistic that
price policy alone could stimulate an increase in aggregate smallhold-
er production. Rather, what was needed was complimentary non-price
policies to help overcome the prevailing technological, land, and cred-
it constraints in order to elicit an aggregate supply response rather than
simply displacing food crops with export crops (Harrigan, 1988 and
1995; Lipton 1987; Streeton, 1987). The WB’s pricing policies also
bypassed the large number of subsistence farmers who did not pro-
duce for the market and yet were essential to the country’s food securi-
ty drive. The adverse effect of SAL price policies on smallholders was
felt not only in terms of the contribution to declining growth but also
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in terms of adverse balance of payments effects in the form of the need
for maize imports.
Thirdly, the SAL conditionality, particularly the fertiliser subsidy
removal programme and the relative suppression of maize producer
prices, conflicted with what the WB was trying to achieve in its more
conventional project lending to Malawi; namely, to encourage small-
holder up-take of improved, fertiliser responsive, high yielding maize
varieties in order to increase the productivity of food production.
Between 1983-87 fertiliser prices increased by 87% and the gross
margins on maize declined.
Fourthly, policy reforms were inappropriately sequenced contribut-
ing to the food crisis and the collapse of the ADMARC marketing
system that occurred in 1986-7. Liberalisation of input prices occurred
in advance of maize price liberalisation resulting in declining produc-
tion. Moves towards export price liberalisation also occurred in ad-
vance of market liberalisation contributing to the collapse of AD-
MARC’s marketing capacities. At the same time as being asked to pay
higher prices for most crops ADMARC was also expected to carry-out
a number of developmental activities in an otherwise unliberalised
smallholder market. This included maintaining an extensive network
of markets and employment, defending pan-territorial prices, cross-
subsidising maize and defending subsidised consumer prices which
had previously been financed by the implicit tax on smallholder crops
which were priced at below export parity. As a result of this poor
sequencing the financial strain on ADMARC created a marketing
crisis with ADMARC unable to purchase maize or distribute adequate
inputs. This crisis was superimposed on the disappointing pattern of
smallholder maize production compounding the country’s food deficit
problem. Following the crisis of 1986-7 the WB tried to persuade the
Malawian authorities to introduce an ADMARC divestment pro-
gramme and to encourage more private traders in the smallholder
sector. However, the government was reluctant to implement these
hastily devised reforms at a time of acute maize shortage (Harrigan
1995: 231-33).
Finally, the WB’s agricultural reforms can be criticised for their
failure to address estate agriculture and the relationship between estate
and smallholder production patterns with the latter providing land,
labour and food for the former. Estate owners were provided with little
incentive to diversify and the disruption of traditional export routes
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continued to depress the profitability of new crops. Agro-industry was
also neglected in the adjustment programme such that Malawi’s export
base, like Jordan’s, remained heavily concentrated. By the late 1980s
agricultural commodities still provided 90% of exports, 80% of which
consisted of tobacco, tea and sugar.
By 1987 it was clear that WB policies in Malawi’s agricultural
sector had failed. Maize production and procurements had declined,
maize stocks were depleted, ADMARC’s cash-flow position had
failed to improve, the objectives of project aid had not been achieved,
export diversification had failed, and the net contribution of small-
holders to the balance of payments had declined (Harrigan, 1997).
These results were partly due to inappropriate and poorly sequenced
WB policy prescriptions. But they were also partly due to a series of
adverse exogenous shocks. Civil war in Mozambique resulted in the
complete closure of Malawi’s traditional trade routes in 1984 and in
the influx of over 700,000 Mozambican refugees. Whilst population
increases in Jordan in the form of the return of overseas workers and
their savings during the Gulf war boosted the economy’s construction
boom, Malawi’s population increase had adverse effects resulting in
increased demands on ADMARC’s scarce food resources. Drought in
the southern half of the country also exacerbated the crisis.
As a result of the above failures the government abandoned SAL
agriculture conditionality in 1987, increasing the producer price of
maize and reintroducing fertiliser subsidies. In retrospect it is clear
that what was needed in Malawi was a complete reappraisal of the
relationship between smallholder and estate agriculture including: a
reduction in idle estate land through both a return of land to smallhold-
ers and land taxes in the estate sector; tax incentives for estate diversi-
fication; and removal of restrictions on smallholder production of high
value crops which had traditionally been preserved for the estates.
That the WB shied away from such reforms was partly due to the
weakness of their diagnostic work but also due to the political difficul-
ties of implementation. Such reforms would have encountered consid-
erable political opposition from Malawi’s powerful estate inter-
ests-Banda, politicians, civil servants and military personnel all of
whom had strong interests in the estate sector. Just as in Jordan the
powerful manufacturing elite acted as a block to sustained liberalisa-
tion, so in Malawi powerful interest groups represented a considerable
obstacle to genuine structural reform.
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The Corporate and Parastatal Sector
In contrast to agricultural reforms, SAL reforms in the corporate
and parastatal sector, with the exception of ADMARC, were fairly
successful. Most notable was the restructuring of Press Holdings.
Although a private company owned solely by the President, Press
played a pivotal role in the economy. It had 45 subsidiaries and large
shares in the country’s two commercial banks. Its activities extended
to most areas of the economy and it was virtually monopolistic in
export trade, retail and wholesale trade, energy and transportation. In
1980 Press faced a severe financial crisis due to the collapse of tobac-
co prices and poor management. This threatened the viability of the
two commercial banks and ADMARC, all of whom had lent heavily to
Press. The WB’s decision to tackle Press arose from the acknowledg-
ment that ‘‘ . . . structural adjustment of Malawi could not be separated
from the restructuring of Press Holdings Ltd.’’ (World Bank 1987:
82). The reform of Press involved a dramatic reduction in the Presi-
dent’s interest in the company, an overhauling of senior management,
share sales and asset rationalisation, including selling shares to AD-
MARC, and new corporate guidelines to ensure Press operated com-
mercially. Government took over some of Press’s bad debts. The re-
structuring was largely completed by 1984 and resulted in a rapid
improvement in Press’s operational, management and financial posi-
tion.
There have, however, been criticisms of the Press reforms. Press
simply passed on many of its bad debts to government and ADMARC.
True restructuring of the Malawian economy required extensive share
purchases by the private sector in addition to share swapping with
public enterprises. The failure to divest to private sector businesses
threatened to jeopardise the strengthening of Malawi’s entrepreneur
class. As the WB itself has asked, ‘‘Has this commercial and industrial
giant been perpetuated to the permanent detriment of local private
enterprise and Malawian entrepreneurship?’’ (World Bank 1987: 25).
The WB and IMF’s general neglect of Malawi’s emerging indigenous
private sector is a marked feature of the adjustment programme.
Within the parastatal sector an important restructuring of the Mala-
wi Development Corporation (MDC) took place under the SAL pro-
gramme. The objective was to return this government-owned holding
company to its original role as a development bank. Reforms took the
form of debt to equity conversions, share swaps and divestment. As
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with the restructuring of Press, a major problem facing the WB and
IMF was the lack of a dynamic private sector to facilitate MDC’s
divestment and to enable it to promote medium and small-scale enter-
prise in association with the private sector.
As in Jordan, the adjustment programme did little to stimulate do-
mestic private sector businesses and failed to attract any significant
direct foreign investment. Both countries failed to improve competi-
tion in the domestic market. Privatisation was also slow in both coun-
tries, blocked by powerful interest groups in the bureaucracy.
Trade and Industrial Reforms
Policies directed at the trade and industry sector were accorded a
low priority in Malawi’s adjustment programme and mainly consisted
of a programme of consumer price decontrol. By the late 1970s most
manufactured goods fell under the ambit of formal or informal control
with particular emphasis on components of low-income household
expenditures. Price controls were implemented using a cost-plus crite-
rion often with extensive delays in processing applications. In an
inflationary environment this created severe disincentive effects on
firms. Such price control played an integral part in the government’s
development strategy. Due to the smallness of the domestic market
and its oligopolistic structure consumer price control was used as part
of Banda’s populist platform to prevent consumer exploitation. It was
also an essential part of the government’s wages and incomes policies,
which helped to maintain the competitiveness of the estate export
sector. The WB failed to realise the role that consumer price control
played in Banda’s political economy and as such adopted inappropri-
ate bargaining strategies with the government (Harrigan, 1995: 242).
Although the Government complied with conditionality and removed
formal price controls on most products a system of informal controls
remained in place. As with Jordan’s continuation of indirect subsidies
through the coupon system, Malawi was also unwilling to remove
price protection from the regime’s supporters.
Poor sequencing was also a feature of trade and industry reform.
There was a failure to integrate consumer price decontrol with an
appropriate wages and incomes policy and there was no attempt to
sequence price liberalisation with effective trade liberalisation. To
stimulate competition and to avoid consumer exploitation and infla-
tion in the context of the oligopolistic domestic market, price decon-
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trol should have been accompanied by encouragement of more local
production and competing imports. Effective structural reform of the
industrial sector required much more than price decontrol and the
restructuring of Press and a few parastatals. But in contrast to Jordan,
trade liberalisation was accorded a low priority in Malawi’s reform
programme. If anything the late 1980s witnessed an increase in con-
trols with licensing arrangements, quantitative import controls and
foreign exchange allocations used to restrict imports in the context of
growing foreign exchange shortages. This parallels the Jordanian ex-
perience where, in the mid-1990s, state restrictions and controls were
intensified to protect rent-seekers.
Public Sector Finance Reforms
Public sector financial reform was accorded a high priority through-
out the adjustment and stabilisation programme of the 1980s. The
public sector, as in Jordan, was targeted to bear much of the expendi-
ture disabsorption required to reduce external payments pressures. The
programme focused on reducing the government deficit whilst at the
same time improving the selection of public investments and main-
taining adequate recurrent outlays- during the 1970s donor-funded
capital expenditures had outstripped the government’s ability to pro-
vide the associated recurrent expenditures and this was detrimental to
the productivity of public sector investments.
WB conditionality consisted of the formation of a public sector
investment programme to prioritise capital expenditures, increased
recurrent outlays along with revenue enhancing measures and expen-
diture cutbacks to reduce the deficit. Initial attempts to increase reve-
nues took the form of ad hoc tax increases, which had severe disincen-
tive effects and discouraged saving and investment (Harrigan, 1995).
Other measures included increased cost recovery. Although revenues
more than doubled during the first half of the 1980s they failed to keep
pace with expenditure growth and, in contrast to Jordan, there was
little improvement in the fiscal deficit. Much of the deficit increase
can be attributed to exogenous shocks, namely, disruption of trade
routes, influx of refugees, increased debt servicing costs and the need
for maize imports.
The fiscal reform conditions can be criticised on several grounds.
The desire to reduce the overall deficit whilst increasing recurrent
expenditures meant that revenues needed to be increased and/or devel-
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opment expenditures cut. As a result, development expenditures in the
first few years of 1980 more than halved. This level of reduction could
not be sustained without severely jeopardising growth and as a result
the WB and IMF revised their conditionalities. In the mid-1980s de-
velopment expenditures were targeted for increase and moves were
made to broaden the tax base, and to shift taxes from external trade to
domestic transactions and from production to consumption. Another
criticism of the WB was its failure to review the recurrent cost im-
plications of its own extensive project portfolio in Malawi, particular-
ly in the agricultural sector, and its failure to increase taxes in the
estate sector. The WB addressed neither of these issues until the end of
the 1980s.
Fiscal reforms were, however, successful in bringing about institu-
tional improvements. A public sector investment programme was
introduced, budget preparation was improved, a debt monitoring sys-
tem put in place, scrutiny of parastatal finances improved and a be-
lated reform of the tax system was introduced.
CONCLUSION
The experiences of Jordan and Malawi suggest that for small aid
dependent countries with a narrow export base, exogenous factors,
particularly deterioration or improvement in terms of trade, change in
the weather, population changes and inflow of capital, are important
factors affecting economic performance.
In the post-independence period Jordan pursued an ISI strategy
whilst Malawi adopted an estate-led agricultural export strategy. In
both growth was extensive rather than intensive with little improve-
ment in total factor productivity and the development process was
highly import dependent. In the pre-adjustment period structural
weaknesses were, however, disguised by a favourable external envi-
ronment- good weather and buoyant export prices for Malawi and in
the case of Jordan the Iran-Iraq war which increased Iraqi demand for
Jordan’s manufactures, the oil boom which brought grants and de-
mand for exports from the oil-rich states, and remittances from mi-
grant workers.
In both countries the weaknesses of the post-independence devel-
opment strategies were exposed by a series of exogenous shocks-
drought, the Mozambican civil war, and deterioration in the terms of
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trade in the case of Malawi in the late 1970s and early 1980s and a
decline in grants and remittances and in export demand in the case of
Jordan. Both countries also suffered from a sharp increase in interna-
tional interest rates. In both, the authorities’ initial refusal to adjust and
the pursuit of expansionary policies exacerbated the crisis.
When adjustment and stabilisation programmes were launched, in
the early 1980s for Malawi and the early 1990s for Jordan, the two
suffered from similar structural weaknesses- a narrow export base,
import intensive production, an over-extended government sector and
an inflexible system of administered prices. The IMF and WB pre-
scriptions were also similar- government expenditure reduction and
revenue increases, domestic credit ceilings and interest rate increases,
liberalisation and efforts to boost the supply side of the economy.
In the two countries exogenous factors, i.e., luck, played a signifi-
cant role in determining the outcome of the reform programme. In the
case of Jordan good luck in the form of the return of 300,000 Jordan-
ians from Kuwait and other Gulf states in 1990 who brought with
them their life savings and prompted a major construction boom
which spurred growth as well as a significant increase in the flow of
overseas grants and loans. A resumption of exports to Iraq after 1992
also helped. In Malawi there was a brief spurt of growth in the early
years of adjustment, i.e., 1982-84, but again this was largely due to
favourable exogenous factors- improvement in the terms of trade and
drought in neighbouring countries enabling maize exports. Bad luck,
however, meant that Malawi’s recovery was not sustained. In the
mid-1980s the terms of trade declined, drought occurred, and the civil
war in Mozambique disrupted trade routes and led to a massive influx
of refugees.
Independent government policies in both countries, rather than the
IMF and WB reform programmes, also affected economic perfor-
mance. Malawi’s spurt of growth in 1982-84 was prompted by the
government’s increase in the maize price and government efforts to
restructure tobacco estates. In Jordan improved performance was
helped by the government’s pre-adjustment devaluation and indepen-
dent tax increases.
The important role of luck- good luck for Jordan and mainly bad
luck for Malawi- is not to say that the IMF and WB programmes have
no significance at all. They have been important in the case of Jordan
in rescheduling foreign debt, reducing discrimination in tariff rates,
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creating a more uniform tariff structure and reducing distortions in the
economy, compared to the situation before reform. In Malawi they
saved Press Holdings and led to improvement in government budget
management. But these programmes alone are not enough. In order for
their desirable effects to emerge, they need to be complemented by a
favourable external environment. This is particularly the case in lower
and lower middle-income countries, like Malawi and Jordan, who are
heavily dependent on external factors such as aid and the international
price of one or two commodities.
The experience of Morocco and Tunisia, the only other two coun-
tries in the Arab World, in addition to Jordan, cited by the IMF and
WB as successful examples of adjustment, is also consistent with this
line of reasoning. There too, favourable outcome ‘‘was sheer luck . . .
Growth was possible because of good weather,’’ increase in remit-
tances, improvement in world prices and substantial increase in finan-
cial assistance resulting from association agreement with the European
Union (Richards and Waterbury: 1996: 235 and 239).
In the case of Malawi, the IMF and particularly the WB have shown
strong awareness of the significance of hostile and rapidly changing
external environment in affecting the country’s aid dependent econo-
my. This realisation was translated by the WB in the late 1980s into a
move towards SECALs, the first of which were in trade and industry
in 1988 and agriculture in 1990 and the disbursement of more funding
along with greater flexibility in approaching the government. The
latter included the acceptance of Banda’s food security objectives, the
need for some input subsidies in the agricultural sector, the need to
co-ordinate project and programme lending, the need to tax the estate
sector and remove restrictions which in the past prevented smallhold-
ers from growing certain high value crops such as Burely tobacco
(Harrigan: 1991).
Higher funding and greater flexibility of the IMF and WB in Jordan
were motivated more by geopolitical factors. Although it became evi-
dent by SAL II in 1994 that the reform process was proceeding less
rapidly and more unevenly than anticipated, there was no delay in
disbursing further funding. A general lesson can be drawn here, al-
though not for the first time (Mosley et al., 1991). Unconditional,
‘‘politically irresponsible aid’’ and excessive relaxation of condition-
ality may encourage slippage on reform implementation, which in turn
may undermine the programme.
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Not only were Malawi and Jordan favoured recipients of IMF and
WB loans enabling some slippage they also demonstrate an important
relationship between general financial flows and compliance. Between
1981-85 Malawi suffered a severe decline in financial inflows making
her more dependent on IMF and WB loans. As a result, compliance
increased. This was reversed in 1986 when a sharp increase in bi-later-
al flows made the government less reliant on the Washington institu-
tions giving them less policy leverage and hence enabling a higher
level of slippage. In Jordan the increase in financial flows, particularly
from the USA, and debt rescheduling following the peace treaty with
Israel in 1994 also reduced compliance with IMF and WB pro-
grammes leading to the re-emergence of fiscal indiscipline. On the
other hand, compliance with the reform programmes in both countries
was facilitated by the centralised nature of their political regimes and
by the close co-operation between the IMF and WB.
It is clear that, in spite of some economic achievements, the Jordan-
ian experience with reform is not an unqualified success. Distortions
in the economy remain, particularly in the form of monopolies, licens-
ing and permits, price controls and complicated red-tape measures
which counteracted adjustment efforts. Progress in public sector re-
form has been extremely disappointing and the export base has not
been diversified. Neither has there been a significant up-turn in private
sector activity or improved competition in the domestic market. The
loss of monetary and fiscal discipline in 1994 has been accompanied
by increase in fiscal and trade deficits. There is also the persistence of
large level of foreign debt, on the rise since the mid-1990s, and the
inflow of direct foreign investment in response to the programme has
been disappointing. The social aspects of reform have also been ne-
glected. Most of these criticisms also apply to Malawi at the end of the
1980-86 reform period analysed.
Another general theme, which emerges from this comparative
study, is the need for the Washington institutions to fully understand
the political economy environment in which their reform prescriptions
are implemented. We argue that reforms in both Malawi and Jordan
yielded less than promised because they were mischaracterised as
free-market private sector dominated political economies. In reality
both relied on interventionist patrimonial populism and, particularly in
the case of Jordan, extensive rent-seeking clientelism. In Jordan pow-
erful interest groups blocked reform. The manufacturing elite blocked
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effective trade liberalisation whilst the bureaucracy blocked privatisa-
tion. Interest groups were less prevalent in Malawi but it is likely that
the WB shied away from fundamental structural reform of the agricul-
tural sector because it would have involved confronting Banda and his
cronies’ vested interests in the estate agriculture. Failure to understand
Banda’s patrimonial populism as reflected in a strong food security
objective also led to inappropriate agricultural reforms.
The experience of Jordan and Malawi also brings to the fore an
important point regarding the sequence of reform. Price and trade
liberalisation are not to be treated in isolation if domestic and foreign
competition is to be strengthened to avoid monopolistic exploitation
in the face of price liberalisation. In countries where state officials
and bureaucrats have strong, detrimental links with prominent mem-
bers of the private sector, as in Jordan, public sector reform and
retrenchment also need to be closely sequenced with trade sector
reform. A weakness of Jordan’s reform sequence was that it concen-
trated on increasing competition through trade liberalisation rather
than on reforming a public sector, which prevented competition. Poor
sequencing in Malawi took the form of agricultural price liberalisa-
tion before market liberalisation, and consumer price decontrol be-
fore trade liberalisation, and more general efforts to stimulate com-
petition.
A final point relates to the distributional and social impact of
reforms. The latter in Jordan has been accompanied by a significant
increase in inequalities and poverty, the alleviation of which has
become a pre-occupation of authorities. This took the form of indi-
rect subsidies for basic items, via the coupon system, cash assistance
to poor families and increase in wages and salaries. Evidence is yet to
emerge on the effectiveness of these measures in alleviating poverty
and reducing inequalities. They have, however, increased the fiscal
deficit and public debt. In Malawi likewise the adjustment and stabi-
lisation programmes of the 1980s were accompanied by deterioration
in social welfare (Pryor, 1990; Sahn et al., 1990). The failure of
reform to design countervailing measures to minimise the adverse
social effects of adjustment present the greatest challenge to the
sustainability of the structural adjustment process in bothMalawi and
Jordan.
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